The benefit system has created a benefit culture. It doesn't just allow people to act irresponsibly, but often actively encourages them to do so (David Cameron, Conservative Prime-Minister, 2011) We are not the party of people on benefits. We don't want to be seen [as], and we're not, the party to represent those who are out of work (Rachel Reeves, Labour Shadow Minister for Work and Pensions, in Gentleman,
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provisions are being cut, and those who claim benefits and entitlements have become deeply stigmatized, it is important to recall the powerful ideological commitment to welfare which transformed post-War British society. The transition to post-Keynesian welfare regime in the late 1970s has been well-documented in critical social policy studies (see for example Burrows and Loader eds. 1994; Jones and Novak, 1999; Ferguson, Lavalette and Mooney, 2002) , with many noting that the Thatcherite assault on the welfare state, and the subsequent embrace of neoliberal policies by New Labour, has led to 'deepening inequalities of income, health and life chances […] on a scale not seen since before the second World War' (Hall, Massey and Rustin, 2014: 9) . One of the major characteristics of welfare reform from the 1970s onwards was the emergence of a consensus (across the political spectrum) that the welfare state was in 'a permanent crisis' (Langan, 1994: xi) . Through this 'crisis lens' the welfare state was reimagined as fostering toxic forms of 'welfare dependency' amongst citizens, itself considered to have a stagnating effect on economic growth and national prosperity. In a stunning reversal of the 1940s welfare imaginary, 'welfare' came to be understood across a wide-range of political, social and cultural milieus as a cause of poverty and social problems: including 'intergenerational worklessness', drug dependence, anti-social behaviours, 'troubled families', teenage parenthood, crime and other 'social ills'. Indeed, the idea that a 'bloated' welfare state is responsible for the persistence of entrenched social problems 'has led to measures of reform and retrenchment which have provoked often bitter controversy in virtually every sphere, from hospitals to schools to social security benefits' (Langan, 1994: xi) .
More recently, in the aftermath of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis (2008), a politics and policy of austerity has emerged across Europe, driven by global institutions such as the IMF in conjunction with state-governments. The British Coalition Government (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) responded to this crisis by implementing 'the deepest and most precipitate cuts ever made in social provision' (Taylor-Goodby, 2013: viii) . An emerging body of evidence demonstrates that the most severe cuts to state welfare are to the benefits of working age families, notably women, children and disabled people i . As Taylor-Gooby argues, 'It is hard to avoid the impression that some […] in government are seizing an opportunity to implement policies which deepen social divisions and undermine the contribution of common social provision […] to social cohesion ' (2013: viii) .
A Cultural Political Economy Approach
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In this article, we will develop existing theoretical insights into the formation of postKeynesian welfare regimes through an explicit focus on the mechanisms through which anti-welfare commonsense is legitimated. The question of 'consent', and the revitalisation of the related concepts of ideology and hegemony, have become areas of renewed focus in critical policy studies, as scholars try to make sense of the persistence of neoliberal political and economic imaginaries, and correlative modes of governmentality, in the wake of the 2008 North Atlantic Financial crises (see for example Jessop, 2010; Davies, 2011; Hall, 2011; Rehmann, 2013; Sum and Jessop, 2013, Newman, 2014; Schmidt and Thatcher 2014 As Bob Jessop argues, in order to understand the persistence and popularity of neoliberal ideas, and the idea that 'there is no alternative', we need to examine critically how neoliberal ideologies, such as an anti-welfare commonsense, are 'anchored in (and help to anchor) specific social practices, organizational routines and institutions, and/or [are] partly constitutive of specific social identities in the wider society' (Jessop, 2014: 355) . To this end, Jessop (2010) (and see Sum & Jessop, 2013 ) set out a compelling case for forms of critical policy scholarship that combine 'critical semiotic analysis' and insights from 'the cultural turn', with orthodox political economy approaches drawn primarily from economics, sociology and political science. What Jessop recognizes is a need within critical policy studies for attention to the role of culture in the formation of economic and social imaginaries. As he notes: [I] n emphasizing the foundational nature of meaning and meaning-making in social relations, [cultural political economy] does not seek to add 'culture' to economics and politics as if each comprised a distinct area of social life [but rather] stresses the semiotic nature of all social relations (2010: 337).
For Jessop then, a cultural political economy approach is concerned not only with how a neoliberal cultural imaginary provides 'a semiotic frame for construing the world' but also how such an imaginary actively contributes 'to its construction ' (2010: 342). Jessop's intervention is highly redolent of an earlier period of British Cultural Studies, notably Stuart Hall et .al's. Policing the Crisis (1978) . What Hall and his colleagues recognised is that the commonsense of public opinion is tacit knowledge -hard to pin down in the moment of its formation, often leaving no inventory once it has dissipated -but nonetheless the formation of such commonsense is central to hegemonic power. To examine the persistence and popularity of anti-welfare commonsense, we need to 'pin-down' how an understanding of welfare as 'the cause' of social problems, is mediated, reproduced and legitimated. That is, we need to examine the forms of 'sense-making' that anti-welfarism enables and produces, and the ways in which this sensibility is anchored in everyday belief-systems and practices. In what follows, we develop a cultural political economy approach to understanding the cultural 'mechanisms of consent' (Hall et al. [1978 through which public acquiescence to accelerated welfare reform is enabled and legitimated. What forms of 'coercion, consent and resistance' characterize the antiwelfare hegemony of the political present tense? (Davies 2011: 103) . What 'mechanisms of consent' are deployed to secure such unprecedented levels of antiwelfare sentiment which legitimate the shift from welfarist to corporatist state formation; formations which exacerbate inequalities and punish vulnerable populations?
The focus of our analysis is one of the key figures of anti-welfare commonsense, 'the benefits brood' family. We focus in particular on the co-production of 'benefits broods' across cultural and political sites of mediation in 2013, when an intensive focus on particular kinds of families within the news media and popular culture became intertwined with debates about the Welfare Reform Act (2012) Neate, 2013) . However, the dimensions of gender-based violence that underpinned this case were erased in the media reporting.
The day after the verdict, it was not the 'domestic abuse' that took centre stage in the media narration of this tragic case, but rather the 'welfare abuse' apparently enacted by the entire Philpott family. The Daily Mail, for example, led with the headline 'Vile Product of Welfare UK' (April 3, 2012 ) and a family photograph of Philpott posing with his six dead children taking up the entire front page (Figure 1 ). In the Daily Mail account, Philpott was motivated purely by economic greed. The
Daily Mail narrates Philpott's plot as an attempt to restore the 'thousand pounds a month of benefits' that Willis 'brought in' and to secure a bigger council house, and states that he treated his children as 'cash cows' (see Dolan and Bentley, 2013) .
This narrative quickly gained media traction and on April 4th The Sun ran an editorial titled 'In the Gutter', reflecting that:
It's hard to imagine a more repulsive creature than Mick Philpott, the lowlife benefits scrounger convicted of killing six of his children in a fire.
And who paid for his disgusting lifestyle? We did. Philpott may be the dregs of humanity. But the welfare system helped him every step of the way. Pearson described the Philpott household as a 'child benefit farm' and concluded by asking: "if child benefit was stopped after the third baby, would so many have been born to suffer and die?" On April 4th, in an editorial titled 'Family Value', The Times described Philpott as a 'violent fool' who was 'milking the system' and whose 'reckless choices' were 'subsidised by the rest of the nation' (The Times, 2013). The
Times leader concluded that it is time to 'look again' at proposals to limit or cap Child Benefit payments to the first two children only, echoing calls made in the House of
Commons as the Welfare Reform Bill (2012) was making its way through the parliamentary system.
A news media consensus was solidifying, in which the Philpotts had been adding children to their family, and had hatched an arson plot, in order to extract the maximum amount of welfare benefits from the state and to acquire a larger council house. A corresponding consensus was also consolidating, namely that the Philpott household was indicative of a corrupt benefits system, that was failing to inculcate individual responsibility in its citizens and which was encouraging particular kinds of large families to adopt a "welfare lifestyle". 'we should ask some wider questions about our welfare system, how much it costs and the signals it sends' (in Mason and Dominiczak, 2013) . He added that 'welfare is only there to help people who work hard and should not be used as a "life choice"(ibid.). The expedient use of the Philpott case by politicians and policymakers, to legitimate and extend their commitment to welfare retrenchment, demonstrates a longer history of neoliberal experimentation, policy-making and thinking, whereby the underlying problem to be solved in post-industrial states is the 'condition of ''welfare dependency," rather than poverty per se' (Peck and Theodore, 2010: 196) . These comments highlight the cultural and political formation of anti-welfare commonsense, via the production and proliferation of a particular figure, the 'benefit brood' family.
Weaponising 'benefit broods': a cultural economy of disgust
According to his biographer Janan Ganesh, George Osborne believes that it is important to 'weaponise policy' so it can be deployed for political ends (Ganesh, 2012) . Writing in The Daily Telegraph in 2014, the journalist Isobel Hardman discussed 'the Chancellor's desire to "'weaponise" welfare policy' (Hardman, 2014) .
We Daily Mail stated that Philpott 'claimed the equivalent of a £100,000 salary in benefits' (Duell and Tomlinson, 2013) .
In becoming 'weaponised' in this way, the actual material and financial circumstances of the Philpott household income recede as the household comes to function as a figure of "welfare disgust". Philpott himself did not actually claim any benefits, and the itemised household income includes the wages that his wife and girlfriend earned as cleaners, family tax credits, housing benefits and child benefits.
Similarly, the overcrowding of their three-bedroom semi-detached house (home to eight children and three adults) becomes overshadowed by the material possessions within it, such as the family snooker table, which are cast as symbols of opulence.
We argue that the fabrication of the Philpott household as a 'child benefit farm' is not an incidental media caprice, but is part of a much broader cultural political economy of 'welfare disgust'.
The Philpotts are just one spectacular example of an abjectified large family, but the cultural economy of disgust within which this example is anchored, is expansive, capacious and multi-sited. The speed with which the Philpott conviction was re-narrated, mediated and circulated within public culture reveals a broader pre-existing architecture of mediations around what we have called the 'benefit brood' family.
'Benefit brood' is a cultural figurations of disgust aimed at families which are deemed to have become 'excessively' large as a result of over-generous welfare entitlements;
'benefit brood' parents regarded as almost pathologically fertile in their desire to secure greater amounts of welfare payments by having more and more children.
'Benefit brood' narratives form a staple of disgust across news media, lifestyle and 'real life' magazines, and pseudo-documentary (reality) television such as the genre of 'poverty porn'. Indeed, 'poverty porn' television in particular has emerged as a crucial site for repetitive mediations of the 'benefit brood' family (see Jensen, 2014; MacDonald, Shildrick and Furlong, 2014; Allen, Tyler and De Benedictis, 2014) .
Tracking the movement of 'benefit brood' families across these different media sites, we see that the same families are constantly circulating through a cultural economy of disgust; from magazine exposé, to newspaper article, to television production, and back again (see for example the recycling of the same 'benefit brood' families in Platell, 2010; Sims, 2010; Peev, 2010; Chapman, 2010; Andrews, 2010; Jorsh, 2012; Chorley, 2014) . Indeed, the Philpott family themselves had previously been part of this 'benefit brood' pseudo-celebrity circuit, having featured on television talkshow
Jeremy Kyle and 'poverty porn' precursor Ann Widdecombe Versus the Benefits
Culture (both 2007).
The explosion of media coverage around 'benefit brood' families is a process of orchestration whereby informal ideologies around deficient parenting, welfare dependency and abject fertility are managed. The production and repetition of 'revolting subjects' such as 'benefits broods' are a central mechanism through which anti-welfare commonsense is crafted (see Tyler 2013; Jensen, 2014) . Through broader citations of large families as a 'welfare problem', the already-established 'disgust-consensus' around 'benefit broods' families was rapidly anchored to the Philpotts specifically. The receipt of state welfare, hitherto marked as disgusting, and now linked repeatedly to the manslaughter of six children, becomes powerfully weaponised and in turn shapes public perceptions around state welfare in general. In the comment sections, message boards and letters pages that accompany such 'benefit brood' mediations, we see the 'awakened lay attitudes' (Hall, 1978: 136) around welfare that are procured and crystallised through these representations. 'Benefits broods', along with the unemployed, irregular migrants, asylum seekers, come to function in this neoliberal order as 'national abjects' (Tyler, 2013) , stigmatised figures who serve as "ideological conductors mobilised to do the dirty work of neoliberal governmentality" (Tyler, 2013: 9) . Such national abjects are constituted and repetitively accumulated in and through their movement through a range of media, cultural, social and political sites, becoming over-determined and caricatured, and thus shaping perceptual realities at multiple levels of social interchange, organizing public opinion and inciting consent for welfare retrenchement.
Such orchestrations should, we argue, be seen as a cultural political economy of disgust, which operationalizes disgust as part of anti-welfare architecture. Such architecture, or commonsense, not only procures consent for welfare reforms, but also in the process transforms abject populations such as 'benefit brood' families, into lucrative and electorally potent political capital. The public comments made by Osborne, and supported by Cameron, are a powerful example of the weaponisation of (welfare reform) policy by political elites. By fuelling public hostilities towards populations imagined to be a parasitical drain on resources, these weaponised cases become 'capable of swaying voters and disabling opponents who find them impossible to argue against convincingly' (Ganesh, 2012) .
From the Nanny State to the Daddy State: the Household Benefits Cap
It has been most encouraging to see how warmly the country has received our changes, particularly the £26,000 limit on families receiving benefits. The
Philpott case was an eye-opener to many, highlighting that far too many people in this country are living a wholly immoral lifestyle on public finance, and we need to crack down on that.
(Gerald Howarth, HC Deb 2 May 2013 GC388)
In Britain it was under the New Labour Government (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) ) that the particular kinds of moral narratives about "problem families" and "poor parenting", which 13 dominate public culture today, first emerged. New Labour introduced punitive policies deployed to manage "failed citizen-parents" by limiting financial aid and inculcating "responsibility" for their own welfare by finding work (see Jensen and Tyler, 2013 ).
Parents were addressed as "partners" in a joint project with the government to raise aspirational children. The welfare state was imagined across many policy documents and political speeches as if itself a parent in the enterprise of producing the citizens of tomorrow. In many ways the optimism with which children and families were placed at the centre of political projects was refreshing: in one of his many parenting refrains, Tony Blair declared that 'children might be twenty per cent of the population but they are one hundred per cent of the future' (Blair, 1999) . At framed its welfare reform project as one that will withdraw "nanny state" succour and eradicate its associated pathologies. In austerity Britain, we are told, citizens need to "re-learn" the lessons of hardy resilience, independence, motivation and personal responsibility in order for the nation to be able to compete again on a global scale.
On the eve of the British General Election in 2010, Stephen Brien of the think-tank
The Centre for Social Justice detailed the 'lessons' of a welfare Nanny State that would become central to effecting the Welfare Reform Act (2012). As he wrote:
Welfare dependency is one of the most pernicious problems facing modern States' (Wacquant 2010) . This shift, he argues, is characterised in policy by 'the new priority given to duties over rights, sanction over support [and] the stern rhetoric of the "obligations of citizenship"' (Wacquant, 2010: 201) . The current Coalition government have explicitly positioned themselves as the 'Daddy State' inheritors and architects of tough welfare reform that the 'Nanny State' New Labour government were unable to effect. This repositioning seems to have been successful, at least if we consult the hardening of public opinion towards unemployed people since the Coalition government was formed in 2010 (see Gooby-Taylor, 2013; Hills, 2015) .
One of the most enthusiastic embracers of the Daddy State rhetoric has been the Work and Pensions Secretary, Iain Duncan Smith, the architect of a matrix of welfare reforms that he has proudly described as "aggressive" (Duncan-Smith, 2013) . This new welfare regime also requires that unemployed claimants sign a personalised "claimant commitment" which sets out the requirements and conditionalities for receiving welfare benefits and the consequences of not meeting them (see DWP, 2013) . Failure to comply with these commitments, decided upon by your 'work coach', results in sanctions (such as loss of benefits for a fixed period), in order to 'incentivise' claimants.
The Household Benefit Cap has antecedents in previous welfare policies, for example in the 'wage stop' of the Social Security Act 1966, whereby supplementary benefits for unemployed claimants could be reduced if their receipt would result in the total benefit payments exceeding the claimant's 'likely wage'. However, unlike the 'wage stop', which was administered under discretion and regularly reviewed, the Household Benefit Cap is comprehensive and inflexible. Most importantly, the 'wage stop' existed within a broader welfarist imaginary, whereas consent for the Household Benefit Cap has been consciously procured through anti-welfare commonsense. The Household Benefit Cap have been consistently legitimated via 'the taxpayer in work' and as 'delivering fairness' to the taxpayer, and to 'hardworking families'. In so doing, the proponents of these anti-welfare policies dramatize a new classificatory politics around work/worklessness. Duncan-Smith has been a keen and consistent advocate for this substitution, giving several high-profile media interviews where he delineates between 'hardworking families' and 'benefit brood' families:
The benefit cap has addressed the ludicrous situation we were in where people were receiving far more in benefits than the ordinary hardworking family earns. It is not right that before we introduced it some families could rake in more than double the amount that the average taxpayer takes home.
(Duncan-Smith, cited in Chorley, 2014, our emphasis)
One of the unusual aspects of the British Welfare state (in the European context), is that it is funded primarily through individual taxation, 'rather than social insurance payments from employers, workers and government ' (Taylor-Gooby, 2012: 3) . It is these financial arrangements that enable the ideological pitting of abstracted hardworking tax-payer against 'benefits claimants'. As Winlow and Hall (2013) rightly point out, the resurgence of an abstracted 'taxpayer' in times of austerity redraws common economic interests between low-wage earners and extravagantly paid elite, rather than between low-wage earners and/or benefits claimants . Such newly drawn equivalences work to generate hard divisions between 'universal benefits', (such as the National Health Service, school-age education and pensions), and selective benefits (such as unemployment and disability benefits) and to divide people 'along a vampiric axis of blame for diminishing social resources' under 'conditions of heightened precarity across a large swath of the class spectrum' (Tyler, forthcoming) .
While one of the initial objectives for the Household Benefit Cap was ostensibly to 'deliver fiscal savings ' (DWP, 2012) , when the detail of such savings came under question, welfare reform architect Lord Freud appeared to change tack and insisted that the message being sent by the Cap 'is a behavioural one much more than a cost-based one' (HL Deb 23 November 2011 GC421). Indeed the vast bulk of of households -three quarters -have lost £100 per week or less under the Household Benefit Cap; small amounts in the grander welfare scheme, yet for each family this may mean hardship, eviction, displacement from schools, social networks and family.
The DWP has resisted Freedom of Information requests about families who have been capped by higher amounts, though much of those cases will be disproportionately connected to higher housing costs in London and the South East.
Such a behaviourist policy agenda is concerned with disciplining families, rather than 'fiscal restraint' and the Household Benefit Cap is symptomatic of a wider "behaviourist turn" in policy formation, accompanied by an intensive social, political and media focus on "behaviourally recalcitrant" social groups (see Whitehead et al., 2011) .
iii Indeed, as Lynne Friedli and Robert Stearn have documented, neoliberal governmentality increasingly involves 'the recruitment of psychology/psychologists into monitoring, modifying and/or punishing people who claim social security benefits' (Friedli and Stearn, 2013) .
The Household Benefit Cap unravels, and effectively marks the end of state welfare grounded in assessed need, a shift that was described in the House of Lords by Lord
Kirwood as 'a direct and dangerous attack on entitlement and the concept of entitlement' (HL Deb 21 November 2011 GC367). In our analysis, the cultural political economy of disgust serves to draw a veil over the dissolving of a rightsbased understanding of state support for vulnerable populations, which was precisely the common, consensual basis of the creation of the welfare state in post-war Britain.
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Conclusion: Combating Benefits Stigma
Two recent influential accounts of the current accelerated round of welfare reform, Drawing extensively on social survey data, these studies draw particular attention to the prevailing 'welfare myths' that underpin public support for the current round of welfare retrenchment. Hills, for example, argues that this welfare myth of 'them and us', has enabled the welfare state to be reimagined as an unaffordable system of provision for parasitical 'benefit dependent others'; those in poverty, disabled people, those living in social housing and/or receiving unemployment benefits. He details how programmes of cuts are legitimated by the myth that welfare provision disproportionately supports a minority population of 'economically inactive' people, rather than the 'mass services' of state provision from which the vast majority of citizens benefit.
The hardening of public attitudes towards working-age benefits claimants in particular, such as families living with poverty and disabled people, marks a significant shift in public attitudes towards the welfare state. During previous recession periods, public support for welfare provisions increased as poverty and hardship became visible in everyday lives. In contrast, during the most recent economic downturn, there has been demonstrable and growing public support for cuts to state welfare programmes for working-age people. This is striking in a period of stagnating wages, insecure work and zero-hours contracts, and in a context of diminishing real-terms welfare benefits, rising poverty and poverty projections amongst vulnerable groups, such as children and disabled people (see for example Jara and Leventi, 2014 ) and a well-evidenced increase of dependence amongst lowincome groups on foodbanks and other charitable services to secure basic needs (Dowler and Lambie-Mumford, 2015) .
In seeking to explain the ascendance of what we have termed an anti-welfare commonsense, Taylor-Gooby and Hill draw particular attention to 'evidence of escalating benefit stigma' (Taylor-Gooby, 2014: 35) and in 'the growing stigmatisation of poverty among people of working age' (Taylor-Gooby, 2014: 36) . This is further supported by 'Benefits Stigma in Britain' (Baumberg, Bell and Gaffney, 2012 ), a major research study commissioned by the disability charity Turn2us, which details how claiming benefits has become increasingly stigmatized since the late 1990s, and more specifically how 'the language and coverage' of negative media depictions of benefits has substantially changed since 2008, with increasing emphasis on the deservedness of claimants and an increased reference to 'large families on benefits, bad parenting, antisocial behaviour, people who have never worked or haven't worked for a long time' (Baumberg, Bell and Gaffney, 2012: 43) .
We follow Hills' observation that a central challenge for social policy thinkers is how to challenge the hegemony of a hardening anti-welfare commonsense. However, while Hill, Taylor The task of a cultural political economy approach is to develop analytical tools 'that allow for an understanding of these ideological inversions, displacements, and enemy-constructs' (Rehmann, 2013: 4).
The emergence, mediation and circulation of stigmatising depictions of "benefits broods" is symptomatic of how the truths of neoliberalism, such as escalating levels of child poverty, are transformed through media rituals into 'acceptable versions' of the values 'on which that cruelty depends' (Couldry, 2008: 3) . While there have been some interruptions and fractures in the statecraft shifts from protective forms of welfare towards penal workfarist regimes since the 1970s, broadly these shifts have continued unabated, and in the current 'austerity' moment under Coalition government they have intensified.
In conclusion then, the cultural and political crafting of anti-welfare national abjects, by political and media elites highlights the need for critical policy research to be attentive to the intersections of cultural and political economies in the formation of an anti-welfare state consensus. If the progressive welfarist imaginary of the 1940s was grown through charitable and Government reports and publications, newspaper editorials and documentary films, then we need to pay critical attention to the mediating agencies that feed the public appetite for anti-welfarist reforms. Further, we need to attend to the struggles against this anti-welfare commonsense in the everyday lives of those effected by cuts to welfare provision. What is at stake is the future of the welfare state itself as 'cuts plus restructuring' combine to fatally undermine 'the political ideas and values supportive of an inclusive welfare state'
(Taylor-Gooby, 2014: 36). Hills notes that, 'misperception…is now one of the central challenges for those making and debating social policies and their future ' (2015: 267) . In this article we have sought to explicate how 'misperceptions' about state welfare are crafted to legitimate an anti-welfare commonsense. Through the unpicking of these mechanisms of consent it becomes possible to fracture this neoliberal imaginary, and offer alternative visions of welfare futures.
